It is important to consider which views of the plight of the dead may have been influential in Roman Corinth – particularly for those who had yearnings for Roman respectability. One obvious parallel is Josephus, who, it seems, consciously attempted to present Jewish conceptions of the afterlife in a way that would make sense and appeal to his Greek-reading Roman readership.
It is worth noting that, although Josephus generally highlighted a dualism between body and soul (with the soul being immortal)[1], he apparently did not consider the idea of future inhabitation of new bodies to be inaccessible to his readership.
Josephus’ presentation of the views of the Pharisees in this regard (two posts ago) are evocative of the reception of both Pythagoras and Socrates, in allowing for the return of the soul to an earthly body. Elledge cites Poseidonius’ summary of Pythagorean teachings:
For the teaching of Pythagoras is strong among them…, that the souls of men are immortal… and after an ordained number of years they come to life again…, as the soul enters into a different body.[2]
Similarly, Socrates is presented by Plato as holding that “the living come to life again from among the dead, a concept that Elledge identifies as “an ancient tradition of palingenesis“[3] – or reincarnation.
Josephus himself puts forward the view that virtuous souls will return to human bodies:
Do you not know, then, that (as for) those who exit from life in accordance with the law of nature and repay the obligation received from God, when the one who has given (it) chooses to receive (it), theirs is eternal fame, their houses and families are secured, their souls remain pure and obedient, having been allotted (by God) the holiest region of heaven, from which as the revolution of the ages they return again to inhabit undefiled bodies.[4]
This reminds of similar wording in the Wisdom of Solomon:
I was a good child, receiving a good soul [psuchēs… agathēs], or rather, being good, I came into an undefiled body [sōma amianton].[5]
It seems that the idea of a soul entering a body was not necessarily objectionable in a “Jewish Hellenistic” context, so long as it was a body fit to receive a pure soul. Such a possibility also appears to be the case in Seneca’s (notably, first century Roman) Stoicism. Elledge points to Seneca’s conception of future bodily restoration following a cosmic conflagration: In the future,
when the time shall come in which the world extinguishes itself in order to be renewed, these things will destroy themselves by their own powers, and stars will clash with stars and whatever now shines forth from the (current) order (of the world) will burn, as all matter blazes in a single fire – us too. When it will seem good to God to set these things in motion once again, as all things are falling, we who are blessed souls and who have been allotted eternal things shall be turned again to our former elements as a small appendage to this vast ruin.[6]
It should not be immediately assumed, then, that philosophically-inclined inhabitants of first-century Roman Corinth would have found the idea of the future enlivening of “our former elements” utterly inaccessible. Bruce Winter is too sweeping when he claims:
[R]esurrection would have been a complete enigma to the first-century Gentile who believed in the immortality of the soul and the cessation of the body’s senses at death.[7]
It may be that alongside a denial of “the resurrection of the dead” in Corinth was a belief in the immortality of the soul, but this is by no means the only possibility. It may be that the Corinthians considered themselves to have entered immortality already. Indeed, one conception of “immortality” in the first century was that of a present divine quality of existence. Epicurus insists that this quality will be borne by those who practise his ways:
But you [the follower of Epicurus' ways] will live as a god [theos] among humans [en anthrōpois]. For a person living amidst immortal [athanatois] goods is nothing like a mortal [thnētō] being.[8]
The fact that Plutarch refers to Epicureans as those who call themselves immortal/imperishable indicates that such a concept of qualitative immortality was alive in the first century:
What great pleasure [hēdonēs] belongs to these people [the Epicureans], and what blessing they enjoy, rejoicing about their lack of suffering and grief and pain! Therefore, is it not fitting, on account of these things, also to think and to speak as they do speak, calling themselves immortal [or 'imperishable': aphthartous] and equal to gods [isotheous]…![9]
Indeed, the Epicurean “rejoicing” in personal immortality went hand-in-hand with their lack of hope for the dead….
Anyway, given that this whole little series is getting the silence treatment (apart from Steph, to whom I am grateful for a most-pleasing comment!), I will wrap up my thoughts here… To sum up: Ummm… oh my brain’s fried – go read the whole lot again and make your own summary 
[1] Elledge draws attention to this: “The majority of Josephus’ comments on immortality present a
dualistic anthropology. This anthropology preserves the
immortality of the soul by accentuating the
mortality of the physical body.” Elledge (2006) 128; emphasis original
[2] Cited in Elledge (2006) 104
[3] Elledge (2006) 107; emphasis original
[4] War 3.372-76 (not my own translation, for once!)
[5] 8:19-20
[6] Cited in Elledge (2006) 112; emphasis mine.
[7] Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, UK, Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 104.
[8] Letter to Menoeceus, 135
[9] Against Epicurean Happiness, 1091b-c
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