I’ll post on this from time to time, as it’s something I’ve worked on in the past, and continue to be interested in. Perhaps the most obvious reason to answer “yes” to this question is the well-known observation that the Decalogue is ordered to proceed from loving God to loving neighbour – and that ordering seems designed to communicate something about priority. I think this interest in an appropriate ordering of ethical directives continues in Judaism, the New Testament, and certain Patristics.
But today I want to think about Plutarch, who is illustrative of a major area of influence on both Judaism and the New Testament: Greco-Roman moral reflection. Plutarch indicates that the movement from dealing firstly with the soul’s preoccupation with passion and greedy desire to dealing secondly with external matters is not at all to be thought of as arbitrary. Rather, this ordering is essential for ethical success. Plutarch reasons:
The pleasant and happy life does not come from that which is external, but rather, the person who draws these things from their own character, as from a well, adds pleasure and joy to the things around them.
Therefore, it is essential that reason must first deal with the soul’s tendencies toward passion and greed, before one can expect to deal appropriately with external things. Drawing on Plato, Plutarch asserts that at the most secret level, the soul inclines toward unrestrained fornication, greed, and lawlessness:
“For it [that is, vice] attempts sex with one’s family,” as Plato says, and seizes unlawful foods, and holds back from nothing.
Reason must therefore bring these carnal desires into line, if one is to expect any ethical development. Echoing Stoic sentiments, Plutarch insists that attempts at development will be fruitless,
unless you throw down the passions of the soul and put a cease to greedy desire, and escape from your fears and anxieties.
It is only once such base desires have been corrected by reason that external issues may become relevant.
 Plutarch, Moralia 100, “Virtue and Vice,” 1; (translations all mine)
 Plutarch, Moralia 101, “Virtue and Vice,” 2.
 Plutarch, Moralia 101, “Virtue and Vice,” 4.